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[8. F. No. 19053. In Bank. July 9, 1954.]

In re VINCENT W. HALLINAN for Disbarment of Member
of State Bar of CaliforniL
I

[1] Attotn8)'S-Disciplinary Proceedings-Proceedings on Conviction of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose
disbarment is sought on ground of conviction of crime involving moral turpitude has not made required showing of discrimination to sustain his contention that he is being denied
equal protection of the laws, where he has not directly challenged by appeal or otherwise propriety of his conviction for
violating Internal Revenue Code, § 145, subd. (b), by willfully
and knowingly filing false and fraudulent income tax returm,
and where he has not shown that others demonstrably guilty of
violating such section have not been prosecuted or that the
section is administered discriminatorily against a class to which
he belongs.
~2] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose disbarment was sought
on the ground that he had been convicted, after trial, of •
crime involving moral turpitude was not. entitled to claim discrimination because the State Bar failed to proceed against
other attorneys who had pleaded nolo contendere, and the
State Bar was ,justified in treating such plea as not being the
equivalent of a plea or verdict of guilty within the meaning
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6101, prior to 1953 amendment.
[3] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-A crime in which intent to defraud is essential ell'ml'nt is a crime involving moral turpitude.

[lJ See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 117.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 73 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Attorneys at Law, § 279 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1,9-11,14] Attorneys, § 172.5; [2-8,121
Attornels, § 141; [13] Courts, § 106; [15] Attorney, § 172.
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(4] Id.-Disciplin&l'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-·-Related group of offrnses involving intentional dishonesty for purposes of personal gain are' crimes
involving moral turpitude.
[6] Id.-Disciplin&l'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-There is no moral distinction between defrauding an individual and defrauding the government, and
an attorney who is convicted of either offense must be disbarred, since his conviction of such crime would necessarily
involve moral turpitude.
[6] Id.-Disciplinal'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-If conviction for any crime can be had
without proof of facts showing moral turpitude, an attorney
convicted of such crime cannot be summarily disbarred under
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6101, 6102.
[7] Id.-Disciplina17 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-Moral turpitude must be inherent in commission of crime itself to warrant summary disbarment under
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6101, 6102.
[8] Id.-Discipl1na.l'7 Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-An attorney can be summarily disbarred
only when record of conviction is conclusive evidence that crime
of which he was convicted involves moral turpitude.
[9] Id.-Disciplina17 Proceedings-Proceedings on Conviction of
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-Provision that record of
conviction is conclusive evidence was inserted in statute to
enable Supreme Court to disbar an attorney, convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude, without giving him further
notice or hearing.
[10] Id.-Disciplinal'7 Proceedings-Proceedings on Conviction of
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-Only when attorney is
indicted for a crime the commission of which would in every
case evidence a bad moral character, is issue of moral turpitude tendered in criminal trial, and if he could be summarily
disbarred after conviction for crime the minimum elements of
which do not involve moral turpitude, he would never have an
opportunity to be heard on issue on which his disbarment
depends.
[11] Id.-Disciplinal'7 Proceedings-Proceedings OD Conviction of
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-In proceeding for disbarment of attorney on ground of conviction of crime involving
moral turpitude, Supreme Court will assume that every jury
in criminal trial is properly instructed to convict defendant
if they find minimum elements of offense charged, and it would
be mere speculation to conclude in any ease that jury finds
defendant guilty of conduct alleged in indictment, proof of
which is unnecessary to his conviction, merely because jury
brought in verdict of guilt,.
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[12] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Oonviction of Orime Involving
Moral Turpitude.-If intent to defraud· is not essential element
of crime proscribed by Internal Revenue Code, § 145, subd. (b),
making it an offense willfully to evade or defeat any income
tax, an attorney convicted of such crime cannot be summarily
disbarred.
(13) Oourts-Decisions as Precedents.-Since Internal Revenue
Code, § 145, subd. (b), making it an offense willfully to evade or
defeat any income tax, is a United States statute, state
Supreme Court must accept interpretation given it by United
States courts.
(14) Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Proceedings On Oonviction of Orime Involving Moral Turpitude.-When the conviction of an attorney does not warrant summary disbarment,
but he may nevertheless have been guilty of acts involving
\ moral turpitude, as when the conviction is for violating Internal Revenue Code, § 145, subel. (b), discipline or disbarment
should be imposed by nonsummary procedures; and the
Supreme Court will refer the matter to the State Bar to investigate whether the convicted lawyer was guilty of misconduct that requires his suspension or disbarment.
[15] Id. - Disciplinary Proceedings - Who May Institute. - Supreme Court has inherent power over admission, suspension
and disbarment of attorneys, and in exercise thereof can initiate disciplinary proceedings on its own motion (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 6107) and, in doing so, it may adopt any suitable
process or mode of proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.)

PROCEEDING for disbarment of attorney. Motion to
dismiss proceeding denied and matter referred to Board of
Governors of State Bar for hearing, report and recommendation.
Dreyfus, McTernan &; Lubliner and Benjamin Dreyfus for
Petitioner.
Gladstein, Andersen &; Leonard, George R. Andersen, Norman Leonard, Charles R. Garry and James Martin MacInnis
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Garrett H. Elmore and Herman F. Selvin for Respondent
State Bar.
TRAYNOR, J.-Vincent W. Hallinan was charged by indictment. with violating section 145, subdivision (b), of thfl

)
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Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 145, subd. (b))· by "willfully and knowingly fil[in~J false and fraudulent income tax
returns. " The jury found him guilty as charged on five COllnts
of the indictment. The court sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment on each cOllnt, the sentences to run concurrently,
and fined him $50,000. He did not appeal, and the time for
appeal has now elapsed. The State Bar filed with this court a
certified copy of the indictment and judgment of conviction,
contending that it calls for Hallinan's disbarment under section 6101 t and 6102:\: of the Business and Professions Code.
These sections provide for the summary disbarment of attorneys who are convicted of "a felony or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude .. _ ." Hallinan objects to the entry
of an order of disbarment and moves that the proceeding be
dismissed on the grounds that he is being deprived of equal
protection of the laws, that the term "moral turpitude" in
sections 6101 and 6102 is too vague, uncertain, and indefinite
to meet the requirements of due process of law, and that in any
event the crime proscribed by section 145, subdivision (b),
does not involve moral turpitude.
[1] Hallinan has not made the required showing of discrimination to sustain his contention that he is being denied
equal protection of the laws. (See Snowden v. Hughes, 321
·"Any person required under this chapter to collect, account for, and
pay over any tax imposed by this chapter, who willfully fails to collect
or truthfully account for and pay over such tnx, and any person who
willfully attempts in any mallner to evade or defeat any tax imposed
by this chapter or the payment thereof, shall, in adtlition tl. other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned . for not more
than five years, or both, together with the ('osts of prosecution."
t" Conviction of a felon,. or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude,
constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension as provided in section
6102.
"The record of conviction shall be conclusive evidence and the clerk
of the court in which the conviction is had shall, within thirty days
tbereafter, transmit a certified copy .of the record of conviction to the
Supreme Court. The proceedings to disbar or suspend an attorney shall
be undertaken by the court upon ret'eipt of the certified copy ot the
record ot conviction.
"A plea or verdict of guilty'or a plea of nolo contendere is deemed
to be a ('onyirtion within the meaning of this section."
t"Upon the receipt ot the certified copy of the record ot conviction
of an attorney of a crime involving moral turpitude, the eourt sholl
••. order the attorney disbarred when the time for appeal has elapsed
or the judgment of convi('tion has been affirmed on appeal. ••.
"The other provisions of this :trticle providing a pl'ocE'dure tor the
disbarment or slI!lpension of an nttorney do not apply to nil nttorllE'Y
convit'tcn ot a crime iuVOlvini moral turpitude, uuleBS expressl1 made
applicable."

)
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I1.S. 1,8 [64 s.Ot. 397, 88 IJ.Ed. 497].) He has not directly
challenged by appeal or otherwise the propriety of his prosecution and conviction for violating section 145, subdivision (b).
Nor has he shown that others demonstrably guilty of violating
that section have not been prosecuted, or that the section is administered discriminatorily against a class to which he belongs
(See In re Pearson, 30 Oa1.2d 871, 876-878 [186 P.2d 401] ;
Snowden v. Hughes, supra, 321 U.S. 1, 8; Southern By. 00. v.
Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 526 [43 S.Ot. 192,67 L.Ed. 375]; Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 [6 S.Ot. 1064, 30 L.Ed.
220].) [2] He claims that he is being discriminated against because the State Bar has failed to file with this court the records
of conviction of other attorneys prosecuted for tax offenses.
Information supplied by the State Bar shows that of the five
attorn.eys involved, a record of conviction of violating section
145, subdivision (b), was filed in one case, but the attorney died
before action was taken by this court, and in another an appeal
is still pending. The State Bar has taken no action with respect to the remaining three, who were adjudged guilty of the
offenses charged on pleas of nolo contendere. In view of Oami.
netti v. Imperial Mut. L. Ins. 00., 59 Oal.App.2d 476, 490-492
[139 P.2d 681), holding that a plea of nolo contendere is not
the equivalent of a plea of guilty and cannot be used in another
proceeding as an admission against the person so pleading, the
State Bar was justified in concluding that such a plea was not
the equivalent of a "plea or verdict of guilty" within the
meaning of section 6101 of the Business and Professions Oode.·
[3] Although the problem of defining moral turpitude is
not without difficulty (see In re Hatch, 10 Oa1.2d 147, 151
[73 P.2d 885) ; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 [71 S.Ot. 703, 95 L.Ed.
886); Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451), it is
settled that whatever else it may mean, it includes fraud and
that a crime in which an intent to defraud is an essential
element is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Jordan v.
De George, supra, 341 U.S. 223, 227; United States v. Reimer,
113 F.2d 429, 431: United States v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022; In re
Orane [Oa1.], 189 P. 1072; see also Ex Parle Wall, 107 U.S.
265, 273 [2 S.Ot. 569, 27 L.Ed. 552] ; People v. Wisecarver, 67
Oa1.App.2d 203, 208 [153 P.2d 778].) [4] It is also settled
that the related group of offenses involving intentional dis-That section has since been amended to ilu:lude pleaa of

tender.. (State. 1953, chap. 44, t L)
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honesty for purposes of personal gain are crimes involviu.:moral turpitude. (In re Rothrock, 25 Ca1.2d 588 [154 P.2d
392) [petty theft] ; Werner v. State Bar, 24 Ca1.2d 611 [150
P.2d 892) [attempted bribe and grand theft) ; Moura v: State
Bar, 18 Ca1.2d 31 [112 P.2d 629] [forgery]; Suspension of
Hickman, 18 Ca1.2d 71 [113 P.2d 1] [grand theft}; In re
McAUister, 14 Cal.2d 602 [95 P.2d 932] [conspiracy to violate
the General Cemetery Act by misrepresenting cemetery lots
offered for sale] ; Barton v. State Bar, 2 Ca1.2d 294 [40 P.2d
502) [attempted extortion] ; Oster v. State Bar, 2 Ca1.2d 625
[42 P.2d 627] [misappropriation of a client's fundsl ; In re
Shinn {Cal.], 186 P. 772 [forgery]; Matter of Ooffe'll. 123
Cal. 522 {56 P. 448) [attempted extortion] ; In re Thompson,
37 Cal.App. 344,348 [174 P. 86] [knowingly receiving property stolen from the mails]; see also In re Rothrock,
16 CaUd 449, 454 [166 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226].) The fraudulent acquisition of another's property is but another form of
theft in this state. (Pen. Code, § 484.) [5] We see no moral
distinction between defrauding an individual and defrauding
the government (United States v. Reimer, supra, 113 F.2d 429,
430-431), and an attorney, whose standard of conduct should
be one of complete honesty (McGregor v. State Bar, 24 Ca1.2d
283,288-289 [148 P.2d 865), who is convicted of either offense
is not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients, the
courts, or the public, and must be disbarred, since his conviction of such a crime would necessarily involve moral turpitude.
[6] Conversely, if a conviction for any crime can be had
without proof of facts showing moral turpitude, an attorney
convicted of such a crime cannot be summarily disbarred
under sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions
Code. ['1] Moral turpitude must be inherent in the commission of the crime itself to warrant summary. disbarment
under those sections. As we said in In re Rothrock. 16 Ca1.2d
449, 454 [106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226), an "attorney'.
name will not be stricken from the rolls where the nature
01 the particular cnffUI does not reflect a bad moral character
with respect to the duties of the attorney's profession."
[Italics added.] (See In re McAllister, supra, 14 Cal.2d 602.
603-604.) [8] The language of the statute itself clearly indicates that an attorney can be summarily disbarred only when
the cnffUI of which he was convicted involves moral turpitude.
Even if it is assumed that statements in the indictment or
judgment of conviction describing conduct that goes beyond
the essential elements of the crime charged are a part of the
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., record of conviction," as the State Bar contends, the record
of conviction is "conclusive evidence" only when the crime itself necessarily involves moral turpitude. [9] The provision
that the record of conviction is conclusive evidence was inserted
in the statute in order that this court could disbar all attorney,
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, without giving
him further notice or hearing. (In re Collins, 188 Cal. 701,
703,706-708 [206 P. 990, 32 A.L.R. 1062].) [10] Only when
an attorney is indicted for a crime the commission of which
would in every case evidence a bad moral character, is the
issue of moral turpitude tendered in the criminal trial. If an
attorney could be summarily disbarred after conviction for
a crime, the minimum elements of which do not involve moral
turpitude, he would never have an opportunity to be heard
on the issue on which his disbarment depends. [11] We
must assume that every jury in a criminal trial is properly
instrueted to convict the defendant if they find the minimum
elements of the offense charged, and it would be mere speculation to conclude in any case that a jury finds a defendant
guilty of conduct alleged in the indictment, proof of which
is unnecessary to his conviction, merely because the jury
bronght in a verdict of guilty.
A similar rule has been established by the federal courts.
I n proceedings for the deportation of aliens twice convicted
of "a crime involving moral turpitude" (8 U.S.C. § 1251, subd.
(a) ( 4» it has been held that the crime of which the alien was
convicted must necessarily involve moral turpitude to warrant
deportation. (United States v. Neelly, 208 F.2d 337, 340-342;
United States v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 759; United States v. Day,
supra, 51 F.2d 1022; United States v. McOandless, 28 F.2d 287.
288; see also United States v. Carrollo, 30 F.Supp. 3, 7; United
States v. Karmuth, 1 F.Supp. 370, 373-376.) In these cases
it is said that if by definition the crime "does not necessarily
involve moral turpitude, the alien cannot be deported because
in the particular instance his conduct was immoral. . . ."
(United States v. Day, supra, 51 F.2d 1022; United States
v. NeeUy, supra, 208 F.2d 337, 341.) The "circumstances
uader which the crime was in fact committed" cannot be'considered. (Ibid.) It has also been said that whether or not
a crime involves moral turpitude does not depend upon "unnecessary adjectives" added to the indictment by a "zealous
and over-carefnl prosecutor" (United ,~tates v. Carrollo,
svpra, 30 F.Supp. 3, 7), for such a holding would "make

250
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of law an unccrtain thing." (United States v, McCandless,
supra, 28 F.2d 287, 288.)
In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147 [73 P.2d 885], is not ineollsistent
with the rule that the crime of which an attorney is COI1\'icted
must necessarily involve moral turpitude to warrant summar."
disbarment. The Hatch case was not a summary proceeding,
since Hatch was given a hearing before this court and an
opportunity to show that he was not guilty of moral turpitude.
[12] The crucial question in the present proceeding, therefore, is whether or not an intent to defraud the United States
is an essential element of the crime proscribed by section
145, subdivision (b), of the Internal Revenue Code. If an intent
to defraud is not an essential element and a person may be convicted thereunder without proof of that intent or other conduct
evidencing moral tnrpitude, an attorney convicted of that
crime cannot be summarily disbarred. [13] Since section 145,
subdivision (b), is a United States statute, we must accept the
interpretation given it by the United States courts. (Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 [69 S.Ct. 1018,93 L.Ed. 1282] ;
Anderson v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. By. 00., 31 Cal.2d 117.
121-122 [187 P.2d 729] ; Oaminetti v. Imperial Mutual Life
Ins. 00., supra, 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 490; see also Hayashi v.
Lorenz, 42 Cal.2d 848, 852 [271 P.2d 18] ; Op. Atty. Gen,. No.
54/37, June 4, 1954, pp. 6-7.)
These courts have definitely held that an intent to defraud
is not an essential element of section 145, subdivision (b). and
that a conviction under that section does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. In United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S.
518 [52 S.Ct. 416, 76 L.Ed. 917], the defendant was indicted
for violating section 1114(b) [now § 145, subd. (b)] for attempting to evade taxes by falsely understating taxable in·
come. He contended that the general three-year period of
limitations had expired and that the prosecution was therefore barred. The United States contended, however, that the
special six-year statute of limitations applicable to offenses involving fraud or attempts to defraud the government was controlling. It urged, as the State Bar does in the present
proceeding, that •• fraud is implicit in the concept of evadingor defeating; and [that] •.. [a]ny effort to defeat or evade
a tax is . . . tantamount to and . . . possess [es] every element of an attempt to defraud the taxing body." (285 U.S.
518, 520-521.) The Supreme Court noted that many statutes
expressly make an intent to defraud an essential element of
the offense, and that uuder these statutes ., an indictment
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railing to u\,(>r that ill/ellt wOllld he d('ffctive; hut nnder
§ 1114(b) such an averment woulo be surplnsage, for it would

)

be sufficient to plcad and prove a willful attempt to evade or
defeat. (Citation.)" (285 U.S. 518, 521.) The court held that
the general three-year statute of limitations covering offenses
not involving fraud was applicable. Subsequently the Scharton case was relied upon in holding that a statute (18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3287) suspending the statute of limitations during thl:' period
of hostilities in World War II for offenses" involving fraud
or attempted fraud against the United States" did not apply
to a violation of section 145, subdivision (b). (United States
v. Beard. 118 !<'.Supp. 297, 303.) It has also been held that the
crime stated in section 145, subdivision (b), is not an offense
involving "moral turpitude" for purposes of a statute (8
U.S.C. § 1251. subdivision (a) (4» authorizing the deportation
of resident aliens twice convicted of such offenses (United
States v. Carrollo, S1tpra, 30 F.Supp. 3, 7; see also United
States v. Neelly, supra, 208 F.2d 337, 340), and that the offense
stated in section 145, subdivision (b), is not "inherently a
drime," but is a crime mal1tm prohibitum. (United States v.
.
Pendergast, 28 F.Supp. 601, 609.)
Two years after the decision in the Scharton case, the Supreme Court in United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 [54
S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381], had occasion to consider the meaning
of the word "willfully" in section 145, subdivision (a), of the
Internal Revenue Code.· In that case the defendant was indicted for "willfully" refusing to supply information about
deductions claimed in his tax returns. He based his refusal on
a claim of privilege against self-incrimination under state
statutes, but the court had held on an earlier appeal (United
States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 [52 S.Ct. 63, 76 L.Ed. 210])
that the privilege could not be invoked. In defining the word
"willfully" the court said that it "denotes an act which is
intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from
accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally
·Section 145(a) states that any person "who willfully fails" to pay
his taxes, make a return or declaration. keep records. and supply in·
formation as required by law is guilty of a misdemeanor while section
145(b) makes a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax a felony.
'rhe United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the element
imported by the word "willfully" is the same for both crimes. and that
the difference between the two offenses is to be found in the "positive
attempt" that is required to violate section 145 (b). The difference is
thus one between willful oll1i~~ion and willful commission. See. Spie.~
Y. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497·499 [63 S.Ct. 3G-!, 87 L.Ed. 418].

)
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II1rans an act done with ban purpose [cifaliolls]; witllOUt
jnstifiable excuse [citations]; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely [citations]. The word is also employed to characterize
a thing done without gronnd for believing it is lawful [citation), or conduct marked hy careless disregard whether or
not one has the right so to act [citations]." The court held
that although the defendant's refusal to supply information
was without legal justification, "the jury might nevertheless
find that it was not prompted by bad faith or evil intent, which
the statute makes an element of the offense." (290 U.S.
389, 394, 398 [54 S.Ct 223, 78 L.Ed. 381] ; see also Arnold v.
United States, 75 F.2d 144, 145-146.) A similar definition
of the word" willful" as used in section 145, subdivision (b),
has been given in a number of cases. (See Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 [63 S.Ct. 364, 87 L.Ed. 418] ; United
States v. Martell, 199 F.2d 670, 672; Hargrove v. United
States, 67 F.2d 820, 823 [90 A.L.R. 1276].)
[14] The foregoing cases establish that fraud is not an
essential element of the otYense proscribed by section 145, subdivision (b), that some measure of bad faith or evil intent is
an essential element, but that 8uchbad faith or evil intent,
which can be inferred from evidence that the defendant acted
without justifiable excuse, without ground for believing his
acts were lawful, or in careless disregard of the lawfulness of
his acts does not necessarily involve moral turpitude.
This conclusion finds support in the decisions of the courts
of other states in proceedings to disbar attorneys convicted
of violating section 145, subdivision (b). Although most of
these states have provisions for summary disbarment similar
to that of California, in none of them was disbarment ordered
solely on the record of conviction without an independent investigation of the question whether the attorney's conduct involved moral turpitude. In In re Diesen, 173 Minn. 297 [217
N.W. 356}, on which the State Bar relies, the court referred the
proceeding to a referee to investigate the question of moral
turpitude, and on the basis of his report suspended Diesen
for a period of three years. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
has established the practice of having .a committee of the
State Bar Association investigate the question of misconduct,
when an attorney has been convicted of violating section
145, subdivision (b). (Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Steiner,
204 La. 1073 [16 So. 2d 843, 847] ; Louisiana State Bar Assn.
v. (!annolly, 201 La. 342 [9 So.2d 582,592].) In the Connolly
case, the State Bar Commissioner recommended that the pro-
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{'{'('Clings be dismissed beeause Connolly had produced evi,;,·l:.'C
to show that, despite his conviction, he was free of •• dishonest
and improper conduct." The court accepted the recommendation, concluded that no moral turpitude was involved in Connolly's violation of section 145. subdivision (b), and dismissrrl
the proceeding. (Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Oonnolly, 206
La. 883 [20 So.2d 168, 170-172].) In Rheb v. Bar Assn. of
Raltimore, 186 Md. 200 [46 A.2d 289] (1945), the Supreme
Court of Maryland said by way of dictum (at 204) that a
violation of section 145, subdivision (a) [wilful failure to file
a tax return] involves moral turpitude,· but its holding was
squarely based on a Maryland statute that directs summary
disbarment for "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice." (186 Md. at 205.) The dictum in the Rheb case was
relied upon in In ,.e Burrus, - - Mo. - - (258 S.W.2d 625,
626] (1953), where the court found that a violation of section
145, subdivision (a), involved moral turpitude. The Missouri
court, however, examined the evidence presented in the tax
trial, concluded that there were extenuating circumstances, and
suspended Bnrrus for a period of one year.
Although every conviction for violating section 145, subdivision (b), may not involve moral turpitude, some convictions may. In such cases discipline or disbarment should be im,posed by nonsummary procedures. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106
et seq.) When, as in the present case, it appears that
an attorney, whose conviction does not warrant summary
disbarment, might nevertheless have been guilty of acts
involving moral turpitude, we have established the practice of referring the matter to the State Bar for an investigation of the question whether in the commission of the
crime the convicted lawyer was guilty of misconduct that
requires his suspension or disbarment. (In re Rothrock,
supra, 16 Ca1.2d 449, 454; In ,.6 Richardson, 15 Ca1.2d 536,
541 [102 P.2d 1076]; In re Boyd, Bar Misc. 2205, Minute
Order, March 17, 1954.) [15] This court has inherent
·Citing In rll Diesen, BUpra. It should be noted, however, that the
Diesen case was decided before United States v. Scharton, Bupra, and
that the statute nnder which Diesen was eonvicted specifically made
fraud an element of the offense. The Maryland eourt also cited in
support of its dictum, In rll Wi!tsill, 109 Wash. 261 (1~20) in which
an attorney was disbarred for solieiting business and filing false claims
for exemption from selective service. In re Peters, 73 Mont. 284
(1925), also cited, was a disbarment proceeding base,} on Peters' con·
viction for filing false reports as an officer of a bank with intent to
deceive the U. S. Comptroller of Currency.
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power over the admission, suspension, and disbarment of
attorneys (Johnsoll v. State Bar,4 Cal.2d 744, 758 r52 P.2d
928] ; 111 re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324. 327-328 [41 P.2d 161, 42
P .2d 311] ), and in the exercise thereof can initiate disciplinary
proceedings on its own motion (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6107)
and, in so doing, it may adopt" any suitable process or mode
of proceeding. 0 0 ' " (Code Civ. Proco, § 187; and see Barnes
v. District Oourt 0/ Appeal, 178 Cal. 500, 504 [173 P. 1100J.)
The motion to dismiss is denied and the matter is referred
to the Board of Governors of the State Bar for a hearing,
report, and recommendation on the question whether the facts
and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense
of which Vincent W. Hallinan was convicted involved moral
turpitude or other misconduct warranting disbarment or
suspension.
Shenk, J., Schauer, Jo, and Spence, J., concurred.
Carter, J., did not participate herein.

